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Abstract 
With the recent Financial and Sovereign Debt Crisis, the debate about a possible EMU exit 
by some state members as increased. So, it is important to understand how a country can 
proceed in an eventual exit. In this regard, this dissertation aims to review the exit strategies 
presented in the literature that a country can use to withdrawal from a currency union and 
the corresponding costs, with a particular focus on the EMU, a rather unexplored issue. 
Despite the limited literature on this subject, there is divergence about the defined strategies. 
In addition, this study pretends to verify if the 2008 Financial Crisis increased the expected 
exit probability of Portugal from the EMU. To do so, we will use a “pooled” probit 
estimation with a sample that covers data from 1948 to 2014, 148 distinct countries and 
territories and nine different variables. Then, it will be extrapolated some conclusions about 
the exit situation of Portugal from the EMU. 
 
Keywords: European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), Currency Union, Exit, 
Strategies, Probability. 
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Resumo 
Com as recentes crises financeira e de dívida soberana, o debate sobre uma possível saída da 
Zona Euro por parte de alguns membros de estado tem vindo a aumentar. Assim, é 
importante entender como é que um país pode proceder numa eventual saída. Deste modo, 
esta dissertação pretende rever as estratégias de saída apresentadas na literatura que um país 
pode usar para proceder a uma saída de uma união monetária e os custos correspondentes, 
com um foco particular na UEM, uma questão bastante inexplorada. Apesar da literatura 
restrita sobre o assunto, há divergência sobre as estratégias definidas. Além disso, este estudo 
pretende verificar se a Crise Financeira de 2008 aumentou a probabilidade de saída esperada 
de Portugal da Zona Euro. Para isso, foi usada uma regressão “pooled” Probit, com uma 
amostra que cobre dados de 1948 a 2014, 148 países e territórios distintos e 9 variáveis 
diferentes. No final, serão extrapoladas algumas conclusões sobre a situação de saída de 
Portugal da Zona Euro. 
 
Palavras-chave: União Económica e Monetária, União Monetária, Saída, Estratégias, 
Probabilidade. 
Códigos JEL: E42, F15, F33, F45 
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1. Introduction 
The European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), the example of a monetary 
union that is mostly under analysis in this dissertation, is an agreement, currently between 
nineteen members of the European Union (EU), to be under a common monetary policy, 
the same currency (the Euro), while coordinating economic and fiscal policies (European 
Commission, 2017). 
The Euro Area was created in 1999 and was formed with the intention of being an 
irrevocable monetary union (Bootle, 2012). Moreover, the Euro project represents one 
solution to solve the monetary policy trilemma: loss of monetary policy autonomy together 
with exchange rate (irreversible) stability and a large level of financial integration (Krugman 
et al., 2018). However, in the recent past, after the financial crisis in 2008, the 2010 sovereign 
debt crisis and the Brexit referendum in 2016, the hypothesis of a country leaving the Euro 
Area (or even its full breakup) became increasingly debated: “Suddenly the unthinkable is 
thinkable. The possibility that one or more of the members of European Economic and Monetary Union 
(EMU) might leave is no longer being dismissed, even by Eurozone politicians” (Cliffe et al., 2010, p. 1). 
Indeed, the recent above-mentioned events brought us some valuable lessons. The 
fast-moving asymmetric financial shocks, alongside with real distortions, called into question 
the stability of monetary unions (Aizenman, 2016). According to some authors, e.g. Arghyrou 
and Tsoukalas (2010), the EMU does not meet the conditions of an Optimum Currency Area 
(OCA). The time has come that, perhaps for some countries, the costs of staying in the EMU 
outweigh its benefits. 
When a country is in a situation where its maintenance in a monetary union involves 
more costs than benefits and exiting becomes a feasible hypothesis, it is essential to identify 
alternative exit strategies that minimize costs for both the exiting country and the group of 
countries that keep the union membership. In this context, the first question this dissertation 
will try to address is: what are the exit strategies from a monetary union available in the 
literature?  
Moreover, this dissertation will try to identify if Portugal was in an exit situation from 
EMU in 2014 and what was the impact of the 2008 Financial Crisis on the expected exit 
probability of this country in the post-crisis. To do this, it will be made an extension of the 
model created by Rose (2007), namely a Probit Estimation, with a rather large panel data set 
for several countries and with data that covers from 1948 to 2014, excluding EMU countries. 
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Then, the conclusions that may arise from this estimation will be extrapolated to the Portugal 
case. 
Accordingly, the objectives of this study are: 1) to briefly review the costs and benefits 
of belonging to a monetary union; 2) to review the available exit strategies in the literature; 
3) to explore the conclusions reached by the literature about the characteristics (e.g. in terms 
of total population, government expenditure, inflation) that lead to the increased probability 
of a country leaving the monetary union and 4) to conclude about the impact that 2008’s 
financial crisis had on the exit probability of Portugal from EMU. 
This dissertation will be useful to enrich the existing literature in this field since, to the 
best of our knowledge, there is no literature review that brings together all these topics and, 
in particular, there is no summary of requirements to proceed with (alternative) exiting 
strategies. Due to the recent European experience and the problems that some countries are 
facing, this contribution becomes even more important as it will be beneficial to guide 
options for countries belonging to the EMU. This, hopefully, would make identifiable the 
risks of exiting within the Euro Area, a rather quantitatively unexplored issue. Finally, by 
providing a comprehensive list of the possible exit strategies found in the literature, this work 
can improve on policymakers’ decisions as well: by analyzing one by one, policy makers can 
choose the strategy that fits best the country economic structure and thus optimize its exit. 
This dissertation is structured as follows: after this introduction, section 2 comprises a 
literature review divided into 4 subsections. The first one contains a brief review on the OCA 
theory. The second subsection presents the costs and benefits of being part of a currency 
union. The third subsection comprises the literature that concerns the characteristics of a 
country that left a currency union and the last subsection identifies the alternative exit 
strategies from a currency union available on the literature. Section 3 presents the 
methodology and data used and the results analysis, with a particular focus on Portugal. 
Finally, in section 4 are presented the conclusions, limitations and future research 
considerations. 
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2. Literature Review 
2.1. Optimum Currency Areas - an Overview 
In order to analyze the costs and benefits that a monetary union brings to the countries, 
we briefly rely on the literature related to OCA theory.1 
First, we can define an OCA as an optimal geographic area for multiple currencies or 
for the creation of a single currency shared between several countries, where the exchange 
rates are irrevocably pegged. In both cases, the currency or currencies only fluctuate in unison 
against other currencies and the sovereign countries belonging to this area define the OCA 
borders (Mongelli, 2008).  
The seminal works on OCA theory were developed by Mundell (1961), McKinnon 
(1963) and Kenen (1969). These authors identify some characteristics that must be present 
in countries to form an OCA.  
Mundell (1961) tries to answer what is the appropriate domain and what conditions 
make a country able to join an optimum currency area. According to Mundell (1961), the 
OCA is a region and not necessarily a country defined by physical borders. The author states 
that a country in a flexible exchange rate regime, facing balance of payments disequilibria, 
can appreciate/depreciate is own currency to correct such imbalance. This does not happen 
in a currency union. However, a country can correct these disequilibria by having labor 
mobility and price and wage flexibility, even if it belongs to a currency area. Mundell (1961) 
relies on Ricardian factor mobility assumption: if there is low internal and high external factor 
mobility, then a fixed exchange rate system is the best option and vice versa. According to 
Mundell (1961), an optimum currency area is, therefore, a region with a high degree of factor 
mobility and low price rigidity. 
Two years later, McKinnon (1963) introduced another condition, a large trade 
openness degree of the economy, assessed with the ratio of tradable to non-tradable goods. 
The author states that the more open an economy is the more suitable is for a country to 
adopt a fixed exchange rate regime. 
Later, Kenen (1969) stated that well-diversified economic structures suit better fixed 
exchange rates. An economy with a wide range of industries reflects into external 
diversification, reducing the likelihood of asymmetric shocks, the need for changes in 
exchange rate and helps to stabilize investment. Besides that, Kenen (1969) also argued that 
                                                 
1 For a comprehensive review see, for example, Ishiyama (1975). 
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correlated business cycles (reflecting, e.g., similar economic structures) benefit from a 
common currency. 
Moreover, Kenen (1969) stated that it is needed an efficient fiscal system which covers 
many single-product regions and should be coextensive with a single currency area, to 
combat localized recessions and mitigate economic disturbances.  
Summing up, and as noted by Buiter (1999), this theory highlights six characteristics, 
which at least one of them must be present to build an OCA: high degrees of i) labor mobility 
and of ii) trade openness across countries; iii) low degree of nominal rigidity in domestic 
prices; iv) similarity of economic structures; v) well diversified production and demand 
structure; and vi) existence of significant supranational fiscal tax-cum-transfer mechanisms. 
This theory began to have some resistance and new contributions emerged. Fleming 
(1971) and Ishiyama (1975) were some of the pioneers to state that the creation of an OCA 
should not only rely on the analysis of a single criterion; instead, it should rely on a 
comprehensive analysis of the costs and benefits involved in this decision. Even if a group 
of countries have similar economic structures, for instance, one may find it costly to give up 
from a flexible exchange rate regime. Overall, “a country’s decision to join an exchange rate area is 
determined by the difference between the monetary efficiency gain from joining and the economic stability loss 
from joining” (Krugman et al., 2018; p. 397). 
 
2.2. The Benefits and Costs of a Currency Union 
As was mentioned in the previous section, an OCA can be formed by a group of 
different currencies or by a single currency. However, in the next section, we will only focus 
on the benefits and costs that a single currency can bring to the respective countries. 
 
2.2.1. Benefits 
The ultimate decision taken by a group of countries, of giving up their own currencies 
to be part of a monetary union, needs to carry some benefits; otherwise, they would keep 
their currencies and let their exchange rates to float freely. The main benefit of a common 
currency is the “monetary efficiency gain”, realized when trade and payments are not subject 
to exchange rate risk (Krugman et al., 2018). 
A common currency decreases transaction costs because of the linkage created 
between countries (Alesina and Barro, 2002). This brings direct benefits such as the 
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disappearance of exchange rate conversion costs (Goodhart, 2007; Santos Silva and 
Tenreyro, 2010; De Grauwe, 2016). With the same currency, agents from different countries 
do not have to pay any tax-conversion whenever they want to buy something from another 
country that belongs to the monetary union. These cost savings are, however, more 
pronounced in a group of countries where agents trade a large amount of goods and services 
between them (De Grauwe, 2016). 
Furthermore, a common currency brings indirect benefits. The introduction of the 
same currency makes consumers more comfortable to compare prices, leading to a greater 
price transparency. This improves competition between firms, which is good for the 
economy (De Grauwe, 2016). However, for De Grauwe (2016) this transparency is not the 
major source of benefits, but rather the possible economic integration that can arise between 
countries in other areas (e.g., institutional, political, financial). According to Santos Silva and 
Tenreyro (2010), a common currency should provide more liquid financial markets and 
increase cross-border investments. We can notice that individual enterprises improved their 
share of trade within the euro area, which reduces the impact of shocks from external 
instabilities on these individual enterprises (Goodhart, 2007). 
In addition, the volatility of the exchange rate causes an uncertainty about future 
revenues of firms. This leads to a loss of welfare, once the individuals are risk-adverse. We 
can conclude that with the creation of a monetary union the exchange rate risk disappears, 
reducing uncertainty. Altogether, these benefits improve both consumers’ and firms’ 
wellbeing (De Grauwe, 2016).  
Beetsma and Giuliodori (2010), Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2010), Aizenman (2016) 
and Krugman et al. (2018) also state that a group of countries that anchor to a stable currency 
or adopt a common (stable) currency finds it easier to achieve a low domestic inflation 
because of price convergence. This mostly concerns with weak institutions (Beetsma and 
Giuliodori, 2009). 
In sum, the main benefit of a common currency is a monetary efficiency gain, which 
is magnified when different countries from the currency area have a high degree of economic 
integration, both in products markets and in production factors markets (Krugman et al., 
2018) 
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2.2.2. Costs 
However, belonging to a monetary union also brings some costs to the member 
economies. The main cost of joining a currency area is the “economic stability loss”, 
following the inability to use the exchange rate and the monetary policy as instruments for 
economic stabilization (Krugman et al., 2018). 
A country that relinquishes its national currency loses the ability to implement 
autonomous monetary policy (Nitsch, 2004; Goodhart, 2007; Beetsma and Giuliodori, 2010; 
Santos Silva and Tenreyro, 2010; De Grauwe, 2016; Krugman et al., 2018). Hence, the 
country can no longer decide on the quantity of money in circulation, on its prices and on 
the short-term interest rate. It cannot either rely on nominal exchange rate adjustments in 
order to solve for asymmetric shocks (De Grauwe, 2016; Ritzen and Haas, 2016). 
So, the main problems come with desynchronized business cycles. Take as an example 
two countries that belong to the EMU, Portugal and Spain. Suppose the first one faces a 
recession and the second one faces an economic boom. If investors keep their trust in 
Portugal, which suffers a budget deficit caused by recession, the interest rate will be kept 
unchanged since investors will compensate the lack of Spanish government bonds supply by 
the high Portuguese government bonds supply because they trust the capacity of both 
countries to pay for the bonds (De Grauwe, 2016). However, if investors’ trust decreases 
when the government faces a budget deficit, investors will start to buy Spanish bonds and 
sell Portuguese bonds. The result is an increase in the long-term interest rate in Portugal. 
Hence, the investors’ fear will prolong and amplify Portuguese recession. Thus, being in a 
currency union may lead to a bigger volatility of employment and output. 
De Grauwe (2016) also states that governments may lose capacity to finance their 
budget deficits because they do not have direct control over their currencies. Without such 
control, it is harder for governments to convince investors (bondholders) that they will be 
paid when the government bonds reach maturity. If the investors lose confidence in these 
governments, they will sell bonds, raising the interest rate and causing a liquidity crisis. The 
problem is that there is no national central bank that can provide liquidity to fight the crisis. 
In the absence of a “lender of last resort”, financial markets can force a default on any 
country that relinquishes their own currency. This is a situation that started to have more 
emphasis after the 2010 European sovereign debt crisis. 
According to De Grauwe (2016), countries that share the same currency witness larger 
costs in the case of high real (and nominal) wage rigidity and of limited labor mobility, which 
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is in line with the theory of Mundell (1961), making costlier the adoption of a common 
currency. Such rigidities crucially depend on cross-country differences in labor market 
institutions and legal systems (e.g., centralized vs. decentralized wage bargaining) which 
contribute for similar shocks to have different (more asymmetric) impacts (De Grauwe, 
2016). 
In summary, most of the costs and benefits of adopting a common currency overlap 
those of adopting a fixed exchange rate regime; a currency union is the hardest form of 
exchange rate peg (see, e.g., IMF, 2016). 
 
2.3. Exits from a Currency Union: Why? 
Even when governments make an analysis over costs and benefits and decide to join a 
currency union, Aizenman (2016) states that net benefits might become negative in a future 
time. Taking the EMU as an example: “What may have seemed like a viable and successful currency 
union destined to “live together happily ever after” (the first euro decade) may have turned into a bad union 
with strong centrifugal forces at times of asymmetric shocks that test the union’s viability (the second euro 
decade)” (Aizenman, 2016, p. 3). 
In this context, it is crucial to analyze the empirical results on the likelihood of a 
member state leaving a currency union, in order to conclude on the explanatory variables 
used in this literature and which will be used in the empirical section of this dissertation. 
There are some studies that approach this subject, like Nitsch (2004) and Rose (2007). 
Nitsch (2004) uses an annual panel data set that analyses 245 country-pairs that belong 
to the same currency area, between 1948 and 1997. The objective of his study is to 
characterize currency union exits. The author relies on the OCA theory to find some factors 
that may help to characterize currency unions’ exits. According to Nitsch (2004), we can see 
a departure or even a dissolution of the currency union because of the members not being 
part of an optimum currency area. So, the criteria to identify an optimum currency area 
(mentioned in Section 2.1) must be present in this analyze. However, even if, for instance, 
the entire group has the desirable degree of economic integration among them, the costs can 
outweigh the benefits of being part of the same currency area (as mentioned in Section 2.2). 
The author states that discrepancies between domestic economic variables and the exchange 
rate commitment or even the practice of poor policies may occur. This can increase the costs 
of being part of a monetary union. Besides that, Nitsch (2004) affirms that many currency 
union exits occurred when a colony gained independence. So, the author also relates the 
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political status of a territory with currency unions’ dissolutions, which refutes in some way 
the relation between domestic economic fundamentals and currency unions’ withdrawals. 
 In this regard, the variables that are present in his study are divided as follows: (1) 
macroeconomic indicators (e.g., real Gross Domestic Product (GDP)  per capita, total 
consumption growth (%), inflation (%)); (2) financial variables (e.g., money supply (M2)/GDP 
growth (%), interest rate spread (%), credit to private sector (% of GDP)); (3) fiscal variables 
(e.g., public expenditures (% of GDP), public budget deficit (% of GDP), central government 
debt (% of GDP)); (4) openness variables (e.g., current account (% of GDP), trade/GDP 
(%), bilateral trade growth (%)); and (5) an institutional variable (change in political union).  
Thus, according to Nitsch (2004), a high inflation differential across currency union 
members increases the likelihood of a currency union dissolution. According to Frankel and 
Rose (2002), Glick and Rose (2002) and Rose and Engel (2002) common currencies promote 
bilateral trade between currency union members and overall openness. Nitsch (2004) states 
that if the percentage of trade between countries that belong to the same currency union is 
small, then it is likely that the union will be dissolved. Furthermore, when a political union is 
dissolved, it is probable to see a full withdrawal from the currency union. In turn, fiscal 
aspects and asymmetries in output between member countries appear to have no predictive 
power in exits from currency unions (Nitsch, 2004). 
Rose (2007) applies a Multivariate Panel Probit estimation in order to identify the main 
characteristics that affect the probability of a country to leave a monetary union. The author 
uses a sample of 69 countries, territories and other entities that have left currency unions and 
61 entities that have remained within a currency union, between 1946 and 2005.  
First, regarding the 69 countries that have left a currency union, about 10% withdraw 
from their currency union before they got the political independence, and about 20%, before 
exiting, waited at least a decade after the political independence. This means, according to 
Rose (2007), that there is a weak link between monetary and political independence. So, 
according to the author, the problem may be in on the macroeconomic variables. 
Consequently, as Nitsch (2004), Rose (2007) relies on the OCA theory to identify possible 
factors that may help to explain currency union exits. First, the problem with handling 
asymmetric cyclic shocks can be handled with fiscal policy, so it is important to understand 
the role of government spending (Rose, 2007). Second, the trade in the economy needs a 
special attention too, once more open economies benefit more from currency unions due to 
transactions costs savings. Finally, the creation and operation of a monetary institution 
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require high levels of expenditures, meaning that, according to Rose (2007), and, for instance, 
Alesina and Barro (2002), richer and larger countries can easily handle with these expenses. 
Therefore, size (in terms of population) and income are important factors to consider. 
Besides that, since exit countries need to establish a new monetary framework, Rose (2007) 
also examines inflation and money supply growth. 
Hence, in his study Rose (2007) uses as the dependent variable a dummy variable 
(Out/In) which is 1 for countries that are not in a currency union and 0 for countries inside 
a currency union. The independent variables are also divided as follows: (1) macroeconomic 
indicators (e.g. population, real GDP per capita, inflation, investment (% of GDP)); (2) 
financial variables (e.g. money supply (M1) growth (%)); (3) fiscal variables (e.g. the percentage 
of GDP spent directly by the government, government budget imbalance (% of GDP and 
positive for surplus)); (4) openness variables (e.g. trade (% of GDP), trade imbalance (% of 
GDP)); and (5) institutional variables (e.g. political (in)dependence, polity variable for 
evaluating the degree of autocratic/democratic state).  
The main conclusions of Rose (2007) are that income and size of the country are 
positively associated with flexible exchange rates, which is in line with Alesina and Barro 
(2002) but in disagreement with Nitsch (2004), relative to output. Countries with larger 
government-sizes and more democratic are more likely to leave a currency union, even if 
they can more easily deal with asymmetric shocks. The inflation rate has also an important 
impact, being higher in countries that have left a union. This result seems to be in accordance 
with Nitsch’s (2004). Though, according to Alesina and Barro (2002), countries that have a 
history of high inflation have the strongest incentive to give up their own currencies and join 
a currency union. We can conclude that even if these two arguments might seem 
contradictory they can coexist, because one refers to countries that are already in a currency 
union (Nitsch, 2004; Rose, 2007) and another refers to countries that have their own 
currencies and are not in a currency union (Alesina and Barro, 2002). 
A summary of the significant variables used by the authors is shown in Table 1. 
Table 1 – Summary of the significant variables 
Variable Author(s) 
Inflation Nitsch (2004), Rose (2007) 
Trade Nitsch (2004) 
Trade Imbalance Rose (2007) 
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Independence (Political 
union) 
Nitsch (2004) 
GDP per capita Rose (2007) 
Population Rose (2007) 
Polity Rose (2007) 
Government spending Rose (2007) 
Source: Author’s own computation. 
 
Even taking into account these variables and the weight that they may have on the exit 
decision, as Eichengreen (2010) states, different countries with different realities can make 
the decision to exit EMU. According to Athanassiou (2009) an exit from EMU implies: i) 
the reintroduction of the old national currency or creation of a new one; ii) the recovery of 
the contribution made by the National Central Bank (NCB) to the ECB (European Central 
Bank) capital, and refund of its foreign reserve assets transferred to the Eurosystem; and iii) 
the transfer of the full monetary sovereignty back to the NCB. 
However, the reasons behind this choice will probably not be the same. Eichengreen 
(2010) takes as an example Portugal and Germany to present two distinct scenarios of exit 
from the EMU. First, we can see Portugal departure from EMU and reintroducing its 
currency (Escudo) in order to create a big real depreciation in direction to full employment, 
because of its high labor costs and slow economic growth (Eichengreen, 2010). On the other 
side, German government can take the same decision and reintroduce its currency 
(Deutschemark) with the objective to avoid excessive inflation, since ECB has relaxed its 
commitment to price stability.  
Yet, these two distinct scenarios have some aspects in common. They have some 
technical and legal difficulties on the national currencies reintroduction (Eichengreen, 2010). 
 
2.4. Exit from a Currency Union: How? – The Case of EMU 
In the literature, there are some suggestions about how a currency union can improve 
its stability and avoid a break-up or an exit from a country. Benczes (2013) argues that the 
original design of the EMU was not viable and, the response taken by the official authorities 
(for instance, the creation of the European Stability Mechanism and the Banking Union), 
was the right way to rescue the euro. On the other hand, Vollaard (2014) suggests that the 
EMU needs a fiscal union, in order to reinforce convergence between countries. The 
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proposal to split the euro temporarily into two currencies (a strong and a weak euro), which 
would fluctuate between them but stay fixed in relation to other currencies, is another idea 
to correct the sovereign debt crisis in the EMU and prevent exit hypotheses (Arghyrou and 
Tsoukalas, 2010). Dor (2011) states that this proposal would carry even more difficulties than 
the euro exit by some countries. 
However, Watts et al. (2014) argue that the only viable solution to re-establish policy 
sovereignty is the full exit from the EMU. Now, suppose that this scenario occurs and that 
one or more member states decide to leave the currency union. What are the (best) strategies 
to enact? This is a question for which no clear answers exist (but rather suggestions) and 
there are only a few contributions. 
According to Bootle (2012), it is more likely to occur a unilateral or a limited group of 
countries withdrawal2 from the EMU, because the break-up idea is not universal among all 
member states. In this way, the author analyses a withdrawal by a weak country and takes 
Greece and its new currency drachma as an example. However, the analysis made by the 
author can be made for any of the PIIGS3 countries (Bootle, 2012). 
In the rest of section 2.4, it will be presented the major implications that an exit from 
EMU can bring and some “exit plans/routes” existing in literature that can be adopted by a 
country in order to exit from EMU. 
 
2.4.1. Legal and political barriers to exit 
Legal implications can be one of the main problems linked with a withdrawal from the 
Euro Area.  
The major question that arises is that if the EMU withdrawal must be accompanied 
with a full exit of the EU or not. According to Athanassiou (2009), Dor (2011), Proctor 
(2011) and Bootle (2012) the legal base foundation of the withdrawal must be the Article 504 
of the consolidated version of the European Union Treaty. This Article mentions that a 
member state has the right to leave the EU with a majority approval of the other member 
states, and to do so it needs to negotiate an agreement that explains all the process of its 
withdrawal. However, there is not any mention for a partial exit, i.e. exiting EMU and still 
                                                 
2 An expulsion from the EMU may be possible, however this would bring so much implications (e.g. legal, 
conceptual, and practical) that the likelihood of this to occur is close to zero (Athanassiou, 2009). 
3 PIIGS - Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece and Spain. 
4 See Annex A. 
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remaining a member of the EU. In this regard, one solution is the country which wants to 
withdrawal from EMU to use the Article 50 to exit EU (and implicitly EMU) and then apply 
to re-join EU without taking the euro as its currency. This hypothesis carries a big risk 
because it will need the major support from the rest of EU member states (Dor, 2011; 
Proctor, 2011; Bootle, 2012). 
Nevertheless, governments can rely on other legal routes that allow countries 
withdrawal, as the application of an international treaty, namely the Articles 615 and 626 from 
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Dor, 2011; Bootle, 2012). If a country cannot 
accomplish the obligations that were assigned in the specific Treaty, then the respective 
government can justify the withdrawal using the Article 61 from the Vienna Convention 
(Dor, 2011; Bootle, 2012). According to the authors, the Greek government, for example, 
could state that the evolution of the macroeconomic conditions does not allow Greece to 
respect all the obligations of being a member of EMU. From another point of view, if the 
circumstances based on the signature of the treaty drastically change, it is possible that the 
country justifies its withdrawal from the EMU through Article 62 (Dor, 2011). Once again, 
by applying this scenario to Greece, Dor (2011) states that the Greek government can argue 
that the disadvantages outweigh the advantages of having the euro as a currency because of 
its strong position, which leads to a loss of competitiveness in Greek’s economy. Besides 
this, the Article 447of the Vienna Convention allows a country to use certain conditions to 
withdraw from some clauses of the respective treaty but keeping with the remainder (Dor, 
2011; Bootle, 2012). According to Bootle (2012), an EMU exit may (or not) force the 
complete exit from the EU but is expectable that an exit by a country like Greece from EMU 
does not bring a full exit from EU.  
Regarding to political barriers, according to Eichengreen (2010), a member state that 
leaves the EMU with the objective to introduce its national currency due to inadequate 
international competitiveness, slow growth and high unemployment might have political 
costs. How? Being relegated to second class status in negotiations that concerns other themes 
and losing an important role as a respected interlocutor (e.g. discussions about the power of 
European Parliament and the European Constitution). 
 
                                                 
5 See Annex B. 
6 See Annex B. 
7 See Annex B. 
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2.4.2. The “new” currency and its exchange rate 
Assuming that all the legal and political issues have been overcome, one of the major 
questions that a unilateral exit brings is the currency redenomination process. According to 
Watts et al. (2014), the new national currency should be introduced in a flexible exchange rate 
regime. Dor (2011) and Bootle (2012) suggest that a country like Greece, characterized by its 
high debt level and lack of competitiveness, should introduce the new drachma at parity with 
the euro (1:1). This can prevent retailers to round-up and make the period without the new 
coins and notes more controllable. However, after the full exit of the euro zone, and 
according to Bootle (2012), it will be necessary a devaluation of the national currency in order 
to restore the competitiveness that was lost during the euro path. The author argues that, in 
the case of Portugal and Greece, a 40% real exchange rate depreciation will be needed. 
Nevertheless, the author predicts that there is a good chance that this depreciation reaches 
even higher values (70%, or even more). To combat this situation, Bootle (2012) suggests i) 
an introduction of a credible fiscal and monetary framework with an inflation target, similar 
to the strategy of the British government just after its exit from the Exchange Rate 
Mechanism of the European Monetary System in 1992; and ii) a determination of a target 
range for the exchange rate, with the objective to guide market’s expectations. 
Nevertheless, Eichengreen (2010) states that much of the literature does not have a 
positive opinion about what devaluation can bring in this scenario (high debt level and lack 
of competitiveness). For example, a country like Portugal, characterized by high real wages 
and exchange rate dependency, may aim to reintroduce its national currency with the 
objective to follow an expansionary monetary policy and pushing down labor costs. 
However, workers will anticipate and react to these government’s decisions and the only 
result will be a higher wage inflation, as they will demand higher wages (Eichengreen, 2010; 
Ritzen and Hass, 2016). Similarly in a country like Italy, where high Debt/GDP combines 
with slow growth to affirm the debt unsustainability, the decision to withdrawal EMU and 
reintroducing Lira, with the objective to adopt an inflationary monetary policy and 
depreciating the value of debt, would result in a fall of credit rating, an increase in interest 
costs and higher sovereign spreads because, as in the Portuguese example, the economic 
agents will anticipate and react to these government’s actions (Eichengreen, 2010). 
However, Eichengreen (2010) highlights that reintroducing the national currency, 
followed by a devaluation, can bring positive effects. Taking Portugal again as an example, if 
all the workers are willing to accept lower real wages and do not exist any kind of incentives 
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for them and for the syndicates to push the wages up to offset the increase in prices, the 
national currency devaluation can really lead to an increase in the price level and reduction 
of the real wages. This leads the economy to a full-employment equilibrium. Although, this 
scenario is made under the crucial assumption that the lower real wages acceptance was the 
result from extrinsic reasons to the economy (e.g. irrationality by the workers), what is very 
unlikely to happen (Eichengreen, 2010). So, according to Ritzen and Haas (2016), one of the 
major steps in order to make possible a controlled exit is an acceptance by the country 
authorities that the national currency devaluation implies a lower real income (measured in 
“Purchasing Power Parity”). 
Watts et al. (2014) conclude that the net effects of a currency depreciation are unclear. 
Benefits may arise from enhanced external competitiveness, but only if translated into output 
gains, largely dependent on export and import elasticities, inflation and the size of the export 
sector. On the other hand, a currency depreciation may cause negative effects because of 
balance sheet effects related to foreign-currency-denominated liabilities and a rise in the 
short-term interest rate. 
Toporowski (2013) argues that even if the need of increasing external competitiveness 
requires depreciation of the national currency, this will inflate the value of the newly 
externalized euro debt and liabilities of governments’ banking system. This implies a 
reduction in the private and public investment. So, according to Toporowski (2013), the only 
strategy that minimizes costs of exiting is the creation or reintroduction of a currency with a 
stable, or slightly appreciated, value against the euro. Thus, the euro debt can be converted 
into the new currency at a favorable rate. However, the benefits of a devaluated currency are 
lost. The author concludes that it does not exist an optimal exchange rate capable to deal 
with both trade and debt needs. 
 
2.4.3. Redenomination process and the “lex monetae” principle 
Another important fact is that the euro will continue to coexist with the new currency 
(Dor, 2011; Proctor, 2011). In this context, all the debt that was issued in euros prior to 
withdrawal will probably remain in euros after the exit. Thus, a devaluation proposal of the 
new currency will increase the debt-to-GDP ratio (Cliffe et al., 2010). If a given company 
needs to repay its debts in euros, while its revenues are denominated in the new national 
currency (devalued), then its financial situation may deteriorate (Proctor, 2011; Amiel and 
Hyppolite, 2015). 
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Therefore, another main problem that comes with an exit situation is the conversion 
of the marketable debt securities (both public and private) into the new national currency 
(Dor, 2011; Bootle, 2012; Nordvig and Firoozye, 2012; Amiel and Hyppolite, 2015). So, the 
question that arises is in which currency the contracts will be redenominated? The answer to 
this question goes through the examination of the “Lex Monetae” Principle (LMP). 
According to Dor (2011), Proctor (2011) and Bootle (2012), the LMP states that 
everything that concerns the currency of a country can legally be determined by the national 
government that issued it. But, taking Greece as an example, the main problem arises because 
the euro is both the currency of this country and the same international currency of the EMU 
(Bootle, 2012). So, if a withdrawal occurred and there was any mention to the “euro 
currency”, it would be uncertain to know if it would mean the national currency of Greece 
at the time the payment is due or a meaning of the EMU common currency.  
In the case of Greece, approximately 94% of sovereign debt is issued under the local 
laws (Watts et al., 2014). So, this could be redenominated into the new currency, applying the 
LMP (Bootle, 2012). 
Bootle (2012) recommends that the government could legislate in order to 
redenominate the private sector debt, governed by the local law, to the new national currency, 
mainly for financial sector debt, with the objective to reduce the risk of a banking collapse. 
 
2.4.4. Exit strategies 
According to Dor (2011) and Bootle (2012), the exit decision needs to be made in 
secrecy to provide an orderly and organized withdrawal, minimizing possible costs such as 
banks run, fall in asset prices, a large amount of capital outflows from the country and loss 
of consumer and business confidence. However, according to Bootle (2012), this also carries 
some disadvantages, like citizens dissatisfaction, because their opinions were not considered, 
and a cross-party political consensus, due to a possible sub-optimal exit strategy since secrecy 
rules out wide discussion and weakens the new policy arrangements. The author also alerts 
to the greater difficulty to keep such a decision in secret, in the euro case, comparative to 
another historical examples. Bootle (2012) states that the optimal decision is to keep the 
number of people who have direct access to this information as small as possible, as well as 
the delay between decision and publication. 
In this regard, Bootle (2012) presents an exit plan for Greece with the objective to 
withdrawal from the EMU. Such a plan needs to respect the following steps: i) the Prime 
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Minister, Finance Minister and Central Bank Governor should meet to plan and discuss the 
exit process in secret and only notify partners from the EMU when the plan is complete; ii) 
before the public exit announcement, other international organizations (e.g. International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the world’s major Central Banks) should be warned in order to 
be ready to support the global financial system, and all the transition made in a short, and 
specified, number of days; iii) just after this announcement, all the domestic banks and 
financial markets should be closed, and the optimal time to do that is over the weekend, to 
avoid bank runs; iv) reaching the D-Day (the day when the new national currency is 
introduced), the new currency should be introduced at parity with the euro (1:1), but the 
authorities should permit euro notes and coins to continue to be used for small transactions; 
v) right after D-Day, the government should reopen domestic banks and financial markets 
and redenominate its debt in the new national currency and announce its intention to 
renegotiate the terms of it; vi) therefore, the national Central Bank needs to be ready to inject 
a great amount of liquidity into the national banking system and announce a regime of an 
inflation target, adopt some tough fiscal rules, forbid wage indexation and continue with 
structural reforms in order to restore confidence.  
With another point of view, Amaral (2013) states that the withdrawal needs to be 
announced in simultaneous by the national and international authorities, and not in secret 
like Bootle (2012) suggests, because such a decision would be politically unacceptable and 
would require the declaration of a state of exception. 
According to Amaral (2013), to ensure a controlled way out from the EMU, with a 
particular focus on the Portuguese exit, there are five conditions that have to be met: i) all 
the financial applications in the Portuguese’s institutions would remain their value in euros 
to avoid panic in the transaction to the new national currency and the government continue 
to pay its debt in euros; ii) the banks’ balance sheets would not be harmed, implying that all 
the credit to companies, families and government would raise in the new national currency 
according to the devaluation; iii) in order to avoid a general default on the part of the debtors 
to the Bank, the government would replace them in the amount of the increase of the 
national currency debt that resulted from the devaluation; iv) Portugal would enter in the 
Exchange Rate Mechanism II8, which means that the new national currency would keep in a 
maximum floating band of ±15% against a reference rate for the new currency relatively to 
                                                 
8 Mechanism that intends to regulate the exchange rate relations of the EMU members with the rest of the EU 
countries that had not adopted the single currency.  
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euro; v) it would require the cooperation of the government and ECB, where the first one 
would authorize a new loan to honor the debt and sustain the balance of payments for a year 
and a half (time needed until the currency devaluation has the desired effects) and the second 
one would commit to renovate the Portuguese banks debt and help to guide the new national 
currency in the floating band. If necessary, the ECB should open a temporary credit facility 
to Portuguese banks during the transition to the new currency. 
Also supporting that the exit from the EMU should be a signaled process implemented 
with transparency, Vieira (2012) states that the withdrawal needs to be made in a smooth 
transition process9, requiring financial help from ECB, EU and the IMF to ensure the 
external and debt compromises of the exiting country. According to the author, the essential 
measures10 to be implemented are: i) there should be a redenomination of wages to the “new” 
local currency (NLC); ii) a risk spread should be applied to credit contracts which are indexed 
to the EURIBOR; iii) bank deposits, debts and financial contracts must continue 
denominated in euros; iv) public transfers need to be redenominated in the NLC; v) there 
must be an inflation target in terms of the NLC; vi) the remaining contracts would continue 
denominated in euros. Besides that, according to Vieira (2012), there are other measures that 
must be implemented to simplify the adjustment process, but not crucial to achieving the 
main objective11 of the withdrawal, which are: (1) affixation of the prices in the NLC; (2) 
redenomination of taxes and public transfers in the NLC; (3) the possibility for debtors to 
redenominate the credit contracts to the NLC; (4) the continuity of euro currency as a 
payment alternative. 
Watts et al. (2014) also present some practical steps to follow in order to withdrawal 
EMU. The first one should be the imposition of a currency law and definition of the 
conversion rates between the new currency and the euro, to restore the currency sovereignty 
(also as Bootle (2012), Watts et al. (2014) suggest that the official exit must happen over the 
weekend). The second one would be the redenomination of financial obligations, such as 
loans, bonds and derivatives. 
As we can see, it is common between the authors the preoccupation and focus on the 
legal, political and economic implications that an EMU exit can bring. However, when the 
                                                 
9 To avoid a decline in the standard of living of the exit country and the reduction in the value of the actives of 
the local banking system (Vieira, 2012). 
10 The primary objective is a decrease in the real wages and an increase in the local real interest rate (Vieira, 
2012).  
11 According to Vieira (2012), the aims of the exit are the current account balance and the reduction in the 
unemployment rate. 
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issue is related to how the exit should be made, step by step, on the one hand we have, for 
example, Dor (2011) and Bootle (2012) that supports the secrecy in all the exit arrangement 
and on another hand, we have, for example, Amaral (2013) and Vieira (2012) who focus on 
a signalized and smooth withdrawal. 
However, this subject has some restrictions. There is a lack of literature regarding this 
theme, so this analyzes relies only on a few authors. Besides that, there is not a big diversity 
on the reached conclusions (e.g. countries covered). 
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3. Exiting from a Monetary Union: an Empirical 
Application 
Recently, Estella (2015) tried to compare Spain with the conclusions that resulted from 
Rose (2007) and concern to countries that exited from a currency union (e.g., in terms of size 
and democracy). The author found that Spain fits well with the characteristics of those 
countries that have given up, in the past, from a monetary union. 
PIIGS, in general, face the same problems, which are a high debt to Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) ratio, high unemployment and slow economic growth. In a first 
interpretation, we can extend the conclusions reached by Estella (2015) about Spain to the 
rest of PIIGS countries once they have similar problems. However, it is important to note 
that the euro is a much more relevant currency than the others which were involved with a 
break up in the past, and financial markets are, in these days, much more integrated and 
relevant (Bootle, 2012).  
Therefore, in this section and with a particular focus on Portugal, we aim at empirically 
identifying i) the conditions that might force a country to exit from a monetary union, ii) if 
Portugal is, according to model forecasts, currently facing the risk of exiting from the (EMU) 
and iii) if the expected exit probability of this country increased after the 2008’s financial 
crisis. In order to proceed with this analysis, we estimate a “pooled” multivariate probit 
model, closely following the methodology in Rose (2007) as a guideline. This model will 
enable the computation of the exit probability of a country from a currency union, based on 
the behavior of selected explanatory variables as detailed by the literature explored in the 
subsection 2.3. The analysis of the results, based on model estimation for a significant sample 
of countries, will be extrapolated to Portugal in order to predict its expected exit probability 
from the EMU. 
In what follows, we describe the data and methodology. We then proceed with the 
analysis of results.  
 
3.1. Methodology and Data 
3.1.1. Description of the sample 
In regards to the selection of the countries in the sample, we took the countries that 
belong/were part of a currency union, following the definition presented by Rose (2007): 
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“By “currency union” I mean essentially that a country’s money was interchangeable with that of another 
country at a 1:1 par for an extended period of time, so that there was no need to convert prices when trading 
between a pair of countries. Hard fixes of exchange rates, such as those of Hong Kong, Estonia, or Denmark, 
do not qualify as currency unions, even if they are currency boards” (Rose, 2007, p. 1).  
Therefore, we considered in the panel data sample all countries and territories that, 
between 1948 and 2014, were part of a currency union, during, at least, ten consecutive years. 
This accounted for 146 countries and territories included in the sample. This information 
has been collected from Lebastard (2017) and complemented by IMF (2016) and it is 
displayed in Annex C. 
As was mentioned before, in Chapter 4, the sample in Rose (2007) covered 130 
countries and territories, with data ranging between 1948 and 2005. Our sample adds to 
Rose’s (2007) sample, 9 more years and additional 16 countries and territories. As in Rose 
(2007), EMU countries were not part of the sample for reasons further detailed in section 
6.4. From now on, we will refer to “countries and territories” as countries, in order to 
simplify. 
 
3.1.2. Selected variables and descriptive statistics 
The set of variables12 to be used in the model is based on those of Rose (2007) to 
which we added one more explanatory variable – public debt as a percentage of output. 
Below, we describe each variable, the corresponding data source and the expected effect on 
the exit probability according to the literature. 
“Out/In” (OUT_IN) is the dependent variable of the model and has a binary nature: 
it takes the value of “0” when a country is IN a currency union; it takes the value of “1” 
when a country is no longer part of a currency union (OUT). As the objective is to compute 
the exit probability from a currency union, the value of “0” is only attached when a country 
joins a currency union for the first time in the time space 1948-2014. The periods before the 
first entry in a currency union are not included in the sample. Therefore, the value of “1” is 
only given to those countries that are no longer in a currency union but that were once part 
of one in the past. Countries that never were in a currency union are not considered. The 
information was collected from Lebastard (2017) and from the IMF’s Annual Report on 
Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (2016).  
                                                 
12 For more information, see section 2.3, above. 
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Selected explanatory variables include: 
(1) “Independent” (INDEP): This variable is also displayed as a “dummy” variable 
which takes “0” for Dependent territories and “1” for Independent territories. By Dependent 
territory we mean that it does not have full political independence as a sovereign state, and 
by Independent territory otherwise. It is expected to have a positive effect on the exit 
probability because, even though there is no consensus between Nitsch (2004) and Rose 
(2007), the fact is that, historically, many of the exits from currency unions that occurred in 
the past occurred after a colony gained political independence (Nitsch, 2004). The 
information was taken from Rose’s (2007) database and from Lebastard (2017); 
(2) “Population” (POP): This variable is displayed as the natural logarithm of a 
country’s total population. According to Alesina and Barro (2002) and Rose (2007), the size 
of a country has a positive impact on the exit probability. So, this variable it is expected to 
have the same effect in our estimation. The information was taken from the Penn World 
Table (PWT) and complemented by that in the World Development Indicators (WDI) and 
in the IMF International Financial Statistics; 
(3) “Real GDP per capita” (RGDPPC): This variable is displayed as the logarithm of the 
real GDP per capita, chained in PPP (Purchasing Power Parity), at 2011 prices, in US (United 
States) dollars. As Rose (2007) states, a countries’ income is positively associated with flexible 
exchange rates, so it is also expected to have a positive effect in this estimation. In fact, a 
more developed country is expected to be more disciplined and thus with less incentives to 
import, e.g., inflation discipline from adopting a more rigid exchange rate regime; a richer 
country also has more means to create and operate a monetary institution (Alesina and Barro, 
2002). Information on this variable was retrieved from PWT; 
(4) “Public Expenditure” (GOVEXP): This variable is displayed as the general 
Government final consumption expenditure, as a percentage of GDP. According to Rose 
(2007), the public expenditure of a country has a positive impact on the exit probability. In 
this way, countries with higher expenditure are expected to be more likely to leave a currency 
union. Indeed, a stronger use of fiscal policy may reflect that the common (or leader’s) 
monetary policy is unable to solve stabilization costs. This information was retrieved from 
WDI; 
(5) “Investment” (INVEST): This variable is displayed as the gross capital formation, 
as a percentage of GDP, which is expected to have a positive effect on the exit probability. 
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This variable is crucially related not to present but to the future level of development of a 
country. Data was retrieved from WDI; 
(6) “Trade” (TRADE): This variable is displayed as the country total trade, as a 
percentage of GDP. It is expected to have a negative effect on the exit probability, since, 
according to Nitsch (2004), a small percentage of trade between countries that belong to the 
same currency union increase the exit probability from a currency union. Indeed, according 
to the model of optimum currency area, a larger economic integration increases the monetary 
benefits from adopting a common currency (e.g., the absence of exchange conversion fees) 
and reduces the costs of participating in a monetary union as shocks might become more 
symmetric. The information on this variable was retrieved from WDI; 
(7) “External Balance” (EXTBAL): This variable is displayed as the external balance 
on goods and services, as a percentage of GDP. It is expected to have a negative effect on 
the exit probability. External disequilibria imply nominal rate adjustments when prices are 
too sticky; as pressures for depreciation imply a downward trend in nominal wages and prices 
under fixed exchange rates; since prices are more rigid downwards, the case for flexible 
exchange rates is stronger under permanent external deficits. Data on this variable was 
retrieved from WDI; 
(8) “Government Budget Balance” (GOVBAL): This variable is displayed as the 
general government net lending over net borrowing (revenues minus total expenditure), as a 
percentage of GDP. Symmetrically to public expenditure, it is expected to have a negative 
effect on the exit probability. The information was retrieved from the IMF World Economic 
Outlook; 
(9) “Inflation” (INFLATION): This variable is displayed as the growth rate of 
Consumer Price Index (CPI) inflation. As Nitsch (2004) and Rose (2007) state, countries 
with higher inflation tend to exit from currency unions as it increases the competitiveness 
costs when exchange rates are rigid. Thus, it is expected to have a positive effect on the exit 
probability. The information was retrieved from WDI; 
(10) “M1” (M1): This variable stands for the growth rate of money supply. It is 
expected to have a positive effect on the exit probability as it proxies future pressures on 
inflation, as predicted by the quantitative theory of money. The information was retrieved 
from IMF International Financial Statistics; 
(11) “Polity” (POLITY): This variable is displayed as a country polity measure, ranging 
from -10 (extremely autocratic state) to 10 (extremely democratic state). According to Rose 
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(2007), more democratic countries are more likely to leave a currency union. Hence, it is 
expected to have a positive effect on the exit probability. The information was retrieved from 
the polity data series “Polity IV” from Systemic Peace; 
(12) “Government Debt” (DEBT): This variable is displayed as the general 
government gross debt, as a percentage of GDP. It is expected to have a positive effect on 
the exit probability. Relying on the optimum currency area framework, countries with high 
debt-to-GDP ratios may find it costly to remain in a currency union because, in face of 
asymmetric shocks, countries face excessive costs in incurring into additional debt and are 
unable to use monetary policy either for stabilization purposes or to reduce debt service 
costs. This variable is added to those in Rose (2007) because of the importance it had after 
the recent crisis, namely the 2010 sovereign debt crisis. The information was retrieved from 
the IMF Historical Public Debt Database.  
Table 2 provides the correlation matrix between the variables, taking the whole sample 
(1948-2014) – individual sample, in order to conclude on possible multicollinearity problems. 
Table 3 and Table 4 present the set of descriptive statistics for all variables, taking the 
complete sample and the common sample, respectively. The common sample refers to the 
balanced-panel adjusted sample that only includes as observations those for which all 
explanatory variables are available for a given country/year. 
As it can be seen from the records in Table 2, “M1” exhibits a strong correlation (0.70) 
with “INFLATION”. Besides that, “M1” presents a significant number of gaps in the data 
(see Table 3): compared to the 9539 entries for the dependent variable, “M1” has only 1312 
entries. This variable was thus dropped from the sample because of its high correlation with 
inflation and because it would restrict too much the common sample of the balanced panel. 
Furthermore, the variable “INDEP” always exhibits the value of 1 (Independent) 
when considering the common sample. So, this means that multicollinearity occurs with the 
constant term(s) of the model and no volatility is introduced. Therefore, this variable was 
also dropped from the sample. 
Besides that, it is important to note that the high mean value for “INFLATION” 
(about 33%) is due, for instance, to the values of inflation verified in Zimbabwe in 2006 and 
2007 (about 1097% and 24411%, respectively).  
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Table 2 - Correlation Matrix 
 
  OUT/IN INDEP POP RGDPPC GOVEXP INVEST TRADE EXTBAL GOVBAL INFLATION M1 POLITY DEBT 
OUT/IN 1 - 0.3659 0.1603 -0.0658 -0.0671 -0.0550 0.0527 -0.1623 0.1334 0.0468 0.2561 0.0653 
INDEP - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
POP 0.3659 - 1 -0.3287 -0.2468 -0.2476 -0.3511 0.0089 -0.1606 0.0782 0.0211 0.2037 -0.0774 
RGDPPC 0.1603 - -0.3287 1 0.2027 0.2469 0.4108 0.5604 0.2774 -0.0881 -0.0454 -0.2691 -0.2215 
GOVEXP -0.0658 - -0.2468 0.2027 1 0.0609 0.0179 -0.1304 -0.1091 0.1940 0.0643 -0.0914 -0.0470 
INVEST -0.0671 - -0.2476 0.2469 0.0609 1 0.2409 -0.1107 0.0476 -0.1092 -0.0336 -0.1135 -0.1222 
TRADE -0.0550 - -0.3511 0.4108 0.0179 0.2409 1 0.1021 0.3094 0.0167 0.0532 -0.2640 0.1734 
EXTBAL 0.0527 - 0.0089 0.5604 -0.1304 -0.1107 0.1021 1 0.4000 -0.0065 0.0699 -0.3694 -0.3356 
GOVBAL -0.1623 - -0.1606 0.2774 -0.1091 0.0476 0.3094 0.4000 1 -0.0283 0.0763 -0.2851 -0.1552 
INFLATION 0.1334 - 0.0782 -0.0881 0.1940 -0.1092 0.0167 -0.0065 -0.0283 1 0.7007 0.0174 0.0509 
M1 0.0468 - 0.0211 -0.0454 0.0643 -0.0336 0.0532 0.0699 0.0763 0.7007 1 -0.0363 0.0387 
POLITY 0.2561 - 0.2037 -0.2691 -0.0914 -0.1135 -0.2640 -0.3694 -0.2851 0.0174 -0.0363 1 0.0678 
DEBT 0.0653 - -0.0774 -0.2215 -0.0470 -0.1222 0.1734 -0.3356 -0.1552 0.0509 0.0387 0.0678 1 
Source: Author’s own Computation. 
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Table 3 - Descriptive Statistics (Individual Sample) 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
OUT_IN 9539 0.28378 0.45086 0 1 
INDEP 9715 0.52877 0.49920 0 1 
POP 6611  13.74084 2.40161 8.38389 19.03881 
RGDPPC 4401 3.58738 0.62346 1.53210 6.66205 
GOVEXP 3657 17.08561 10.01279 2.04712 163.57930 
INVEST 3601 22.38771 12.82310 -2.42436 219.06940 
TRADE 4074 83.64908 56.92843 0.02010 860.80000 
EXTBAL 4159 -9.22680 24.51662 -344.75080 81.69724 
GOVBAL 2205 -2.77290 22.24285 -557.49900 122.18800 
INFLATION 3539 20.57954 420.37090 -35.83668 24411.03000 
M1 1312 0.42235 1.36170 -.43445 13.55132 
POLITY 3927 -1.74943 6.58232 -10 10 
DEBT 3665 61.30607 63.58927 0.00391 784.35100 
Source: Author’s own computation. 
 
 
Table 4 - Descriptive Statistics (Common Sample) with M1 dropped 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
OUT_IN 1259 0.63066 0.482818 0 1 
INDEP 1259 1 0 1 1 
POP 1259 15.70011 1.48610 12.83741 19.03881 
RGDPPC 1259 3.57826 0.56258 1.99639 5.19542 
GOVEXP 1259 15.25449 6.22046 2.73606 76.22213 
INVEST 1259 24.12301 15.94314 1.09681 219.06944 
TRADE 1259 85.26016 60.15854 0.17500 531.73744 
EXTBAL 1259 -7.31512 26.76894 -344.75077 49.76069 
GOVBAL 1259 -3.04260 25.87607 -557.49900 43.30300 
INFLATION 1259 32.82781 698.45600 -35.83668 24411.03081 
POLITY 1259 0.40588 6.24090 -10 10 
DEBT 1259 63.42963 54.42595 0.47441 523.38200 
Source: Author’s own computation. 
 
3.1.3. Model’s specification 
As mentioned before, the model that it will be used is a binary choice model, in 
particular, a “pooled” multivariate probit model. This type of model is commonly used in 
situations where the dependent variable is a qualitative variable and only exists two possible 
choices, mutually exclusive (in this case, “0” means that a country is IN a currency union and 
“1” means that a country is OUT of a currency union). 
According to Greene (2011), the binary choice model is motivated as latent variables 
specification, being this result from the latent variable represented as follows: 
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𝑦𝑖=
∗ 𝑥𝑖
′𝛽 + 𝜖𝑖     (6.1) 
 
where: i = 1,...,n;  𝜖𝑖 is a random perturbance; 𝜖𝑖~𝑁(0, 𝜎
2).  
Then, the observed dependent variable is determined by whether 𝑦𝑖
∗ exceeds a 
threshold value: 
 
𝑦𝑖 = {
1, 𝑖𝑓   𝑦𝑖
∗ > 0
0, 𝑖𝑓   𝑦𝑖
∗ ≤ 0
 i = 1,…,n    (6.2) 
 
Thus, the probabilities of the response variable are: 
 
𝑃(𝑦𝑖 = 1|𝑥𝑖) = 𝑃(𝑦𝑖
∗ > 0|𝑥𝑖) = 𝑃(𝜖𝑖 > −𝑥𝑖
′𝛽|𝑥𝑖) =  𝑃(𝜖𝑖 < 𝑥𝑖
′𝛽|𝑥𝑖) = F(𝑥
′𝛽) (6.3) 
 
where F=Φ and Φ  is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal 
distribution. This function is represented as follows:  
 
Φ(𝑤) = ∫
1
√2𝜋
𝑒𝑥𝑝 {−
1
2
𝑤
−∞
𝑡2}𝑑𝑡.    (6.4) 
 
Thus, the probit model is a regression given by: 
 
E(𝑦𝑖|𝑥𝑖) = Φ(𝑥𝑖
′𝛽)     (6.5) 
 
Relatively to the interpretation of the coefficient values, there is not a direct 
interpretation because they cannot be straightly interpreted as the marginal effect on the 
dependent variable. So, the marginal effect of 𝑥𝑖 in the conditional probability is computed 
through using 
 
𝜕𝑃(𝑦𝑖 = 1|𝑥𝑖)
𝜕𝑥𝑖
=
𝜕𝐸(𝑦𝑖|𝑥𝑖)
𝜕𝑥𝑖
= Φ(𝑥𝑖
′𝛽)𝛽    (6.6) 
 
Thus, a change of one unit in 𝑥𝑖 increases probability of 𝑦𝑖 = 1 in Φ(𝑥𝑖
′𝛽)𝛽 points. 
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3.2. Analysis of Results 
3.2.1. Pooled vs random effects (RE) vs fixed effects (FE) 
Using Stata v.14.2 software, we estimated both a pooled model (Table 5) against a RE 
panel data model (Table 6). Indeed, the latter model clearly exhibits that panel-level variance 
component is important, as shown by the log-likelihood ratio test in the bottom of the output 
(Table 6, line 15) and thus a panel probit should be estimated. However, data is not a random 
draw from a large sample as it covers for the countries that have actually engaged in monetary 
unions since 1948. So, apparently, on the one hand, unobserved heterogeneity would come 
from country-specific fixed effects than from country-specific error-term effects; on the 
other hand, it is likely to expect country-specific error component to be correlated with 
regressors since cross-sections are not random drawings from a larger sample (e.g., lack of 
international credibility - absent - is related to weak economic performance indicators in the 
model). In this case, FE panel data model would be more appropriate and RE estimators 
would be biased (Gujarati, 2003). 
However, FE model is not available for computation in panel probit using Stata. So, 
we defined alternative dummies to capture country-specific fixed effects in regular “pooled” 
probit estimation. As we can see in Annex D, this probit estimation with alternative 
dummies13 shows that, indeed, fixed effects exist between these regions of countries. We can 
say that, e.g., countries from Asia, in average, have a bigger probability to exit from a currency 
union than those from Africa in 0.0736514 percentage points and countries from America, in 
average, have a lower probability to exit from a currency union than those from Africa in 
0.1054915 percentage points. 
 Even defining alternative dummies to capture country-specific fixed effects in regular 
“pooled” probit estimation, computation is too expensive in terms of degrees of freedom 
and does not allow forecasting exit probabilities for the specific case of EMU countries. In 
face of this trade-off, together with i) the outcomes from “pooled” probit estimation are 
strongly in line with what is expected from economic theory and ii) “pooled” probit 
estimation was followed by reference paper for our study, Rose (2007), we decided to analyze 
outputs from the “pooled” probit model, referring to it as the baseline model. 
                                                 
13 These dummies were allocated as follows: 1- Africa; 2- Asia; 3- America; 4-Oceania; 5- Europe. 
14 See Annex E. 
15 See Annex E. 
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According to Greene (2004) “pooled” estimator is the simple probit estimator that 
treats the entire sample as if it were a large cross section. This estimator is consistent but 
inefficient. So, average or expected values of the estimators are equal to the true values. 
However, their variance is larger, so it makes it less accurate for statistical inference, but this 
problem is expected to be limited given that cross-section units in the sample are close to 
population’s. 
 
Table 5 - Pooled probit estimation 
Variable Coefficient  Robust Std. Err. P>|z| 
POP 0.47411*** 0.03436 0.000 
RGDPPC 1.41871*** 0.13369 0.000 
GOVEXP 0.0052 0.00772 0.504 
INVEST -0.00821** 0.00413 0.047 
TRADE -0.00147* 0.00083 0.077 
EXTBAL -0.00752** 0.00308 0.015 
GOVBAL -0.00185 0.00117 0.113 
INFLATION 0.00965* 0.00565 0.088 
POLITY 0.03746*** 0.00683 0.000 
DEBT 0.00347*** 0.00087 0.000 
CONSTANT -12.23132*** 0.82843 0.000 
McFadden pseudo R2 = 0.2340 
Log likelihood = -635.12187 
Total observations: 1259 
Note: * (significant at 0.10); ** (significant at 0.05); *** (significant at 0.01). 
Source: Author’s own computation. 
 
 
 29 
Table 6 - RE probit estimation 
Variable Coefficient  Std. Err. P>|z| 
POP 1.54022*** 0.5012168 0.002 
RGDPPC 2.93620 2.329939 0.208 
GOVEXP -0.0695462 0.0467445 0.137 
INVEST 0.0718718* 0.0425254 0.091 
TRADE -0.0163106 0.0162756 0.316 
EXTBAL -0.0054728 0.0153574 0.722 
GOVBAL 0.0226983 0.0288623   0.432 
INFLATION 0.0021299 0.0021099 0.313 
POLITY 0.013131 0.0517738 0.800 
DEBT 0.0048809 0.0032268 0.130 
CONSTANT -31.164 - - 
Number of groups: 65 
Log pseudolikelihood = -86.60758 
Likelihood ratio test = 1097.03 and Prob≥chibar2 = 0.000 
Total observations: 1259 
Note: * (significant at 0.10); ** (significant at 0.05); *** (significant at 0.01). 
Source: Author’s own computation. 
 
3.2.2. Assessing exit probabilities 
Regarding the results on the pooled probit estimation (Table 5), eight out of the ten 
explanatory variables are statistically significant (within 90% of confidence). However, 
“government budget balance (GOVBAL)” is very close to the threshold of 10% significance 
level (GOVBAL is significant at 11.3% and exhibits the correct sign). The variable “Public 
expenditure (GOVEXP)”, in contrast to the conclusions reached by Rose (2007), is not 
significant at 90% confidence. 
Moreover, all the significant variables appear to have the expected impact (sign) on the 
likelihood of exiting from a monetary union. As referred before, in Section 3.1.3, the resulted 
coefficients cannot be directly interpreted. Thus, the computation of marginal effects is in 
order to assess the effect of an unit change in a given variable on the exit probability 𝑃(𝑌 =
1|𝑋). The marginal effects of each explanatory variable are represented in Table 7, and their 
interpretation is as follows, “ceteris paribus”: e.g., an increase of 1% in real GDP per capita 
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leads to an increase, in average, of 0.40511 percentage points on the expected exit probability 
whereas an increase of 1 percentage point in trade as percentage of GDP leads to a decrease, 
in average, of 0.00042 percentage points on the expected exit probability. 
 
Table 7 - Marginal effects 
Variable dy/dx Std. Err. 
POP 0.13538 0.00795 
RGDPPC 0.40511 0.03236 
GOVEXP 0.00147 0.00221 
INVEST -0.00234 0.00117 
TRADE -0.00042 0.00024 
EXTBAL -0.00215 0.00087 
GOVBAL -0.00053 0.00033 
INFLATION 0.00275 0.00159 
POLITY 0.01070 0.00191 
DEBT 0.00099 0.00025 
Source: Author’s own computation. 
 
3.2.3. Model goodness-of-fit 
We have performed a Pearson 2-type test of goodness-of-fit. The objective is to 
compare actual values with fitted expected values by group. After running the test, we have 
got a Prob > 2 =0.0004, which means that the predicted probabilities from the model differ 
significantly from the observed probabilities in the data. So, we can conclude that our model 
does not fit the data well. However, this result is biased by robust standard errors. 
With this, we also performed a classification table. This compares the fitted and actual 
values based on a 0.50 cut-off point. The overall rate of correct classification is estimated to 
be 74.8%. 
As we can see in Table 5, the baseline model has a McFadden’s pseudo R-squared 
equal to 0.2340. This means that only 23.4% of the results are explained by the variables that 
we used in the model.  
Besides that, as was referred above in section 3.2.1, it was estimated a FE model to 
capture some country-specific effects in the baseline model (Annex D). We can see that the 
results from the FE model are similar to those in the baseline model, in terms of magnitude 
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and coefficients’ signal. Only the variable GOVBAL changed from non-significant to 
significant at 5%. In general, these results give robustness to our baseline model. 
 
3.3. Model Extension: the Case of Portugal in the EMU 
The purpose of this section is to use the baseline model to assess the probability of 
Portugal to exit the EMU. Additionally, we also conjecture on how the recent economic and 
financial crisis may have impacted on the expected probability of Portugal leaving EMU. 
In order to proceed, we first characterize the countries which exhibit a probability of 
exiting a currency union (forecast exit probability above 50%) and those who are expected 
to remain members of a currency union (forecast exit probability below 50%), based on the 
results from the baseline model and using the most recent data collected, 2014. Secondly, 
using data for Portugal, we conjecture if the country was more or less likely to exit EMU in 
2014. Finally, and because the depth of the recent-past economic and financial crisis 
relaunched the debate on the sustainability of the EMU, we also assess the impacts the 
economic and financial crisis had on the expected exit probability of Portugal from EMU. 
 
3.3.1. Stylized conditions for exiting a currency union and the case 
of Portugal 
First, we selected sample countries that were in a currency union in 2014 in order to 
compute the forecast of the corresponding expected exit probabilities. In 2014, 82 countries 
from the whole sample were in a currency union in 2014. However, we only have complete 
data, for that year, and for all the variables, for 22 out of those 82 countries. For each of 
these countries, Table 8 depicts the corresponding expected exit probabilities.  
We then proceed with splitting these countries into two groups: one group for those 
countries exhibiting an expected exit probability lower than 50%, and other including 
countries to which expected exit probability is higher than 50%. Since only 7 out of 22 
countries that have an expected exit probability below 50%, we decided to use, instead, the 
median as a threshold (0.55488). Group 1 includes countries with expected exit probability 
below 0.55488; Group 2 includes the remainder. Accordingly, country distribution is 
presented in Table 9.  
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After this, we computed16 the median values for all the ten explanatory variables for both 
groups. The purpose was to check whether the Portuguese profile is more identical to that 
of Group 1 or of Group 2 and, hence, to conclude about its exit probability. Note that, 
despite of exhibiting, on average, higher inflation and debt and lower government budget 
and external balances, countries in Group 1 have lower exit probabilities than those on 
Group 2. From the records in Table 10, Portugal’s profile is more identical to those countries 
of group 2. So, we can conclude that, in 2014, Portugal had an expected exit probability 
higher than 0.55488. This might even be reinforced by out-of-sample records of much higher 
debt and government deficits, while mitigated by the lower inflation and positive external 
balance records. 
 
                                                 
16 See Table 10. 
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Table 8 - Countries belonging to a currency union in 2014 and the respective 
expected exit probabilities 
Country Expected exit probability in 2014 
Benin 0.6351 
Bhutan 0.52674 
Burkina Faso 0.67684 
Cameroon 0.10132 
Central African Republic 0.19278 
Chad 0.52973 
Congo 0.38200 
Ecuador 0.87181 
El Salvador 0.78427 
Equatorial Guinea 0.30426 
Gabon 0.56246 
Ivory Coast 0.79205 
Lesotho 0.51380 
Liberia 0.46369 
Namibia 0.73086 
Niger 0.54731 
Qatar 0.89641 
Senegal 0.77612 
Swaziland 0.26877 
Togo 0.38274 
United Arab Emirates 0.92602 
Zimbabwe 0.73444 
Source: Author’s own computation. 
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Table 9 – Group definition based on median expected exit probability 
Group 1 Group 2 
Bhutan Benin 
Cameroon Burkina Faso 
Central African Rep Ecuador 
Chad El Salvador 
Congo Gabon 
Equatorial Guinea Ivory Coast 
Lesotho Namibia 
Liberia Qatar 
Niger Senegal 
Swaziland United Arab Emirates 
Togo Zimbabwe 
Source: Author’s own computation. 
 
Table 10 - Groups variables sample mean compared to Portugal (2014) 
 Group 1 Group 2 Portugal 
POP 15.30171 15.70803 16.15754 (2) 
RGDPPC 3.30134 3.91127 4.43212 (2) 
GOVEXP 14.65722 18.07949 18.60756 (2) 
INVEST 27.99690 25.39681 15.30302 (2) 
TRADE 90.40526 89.94225 79.95976 (2) 
EXTBAL -14.49826 -5.85143 0.18899 (2) 
GOVBAL -3.69245 -0.26145 -7.16600(1) 
INFLATION 5.09282 2.24178 -0.27815 (2) 
POLITY -0.90909 3.09091 10 (2) 
DEBT 39.64257 38.91495 130.16539 (1) 
Notes: The group number towards which the values for Portugal are closer to is presented in brackets 
in the last column of the table. 
Source: Author’s own computation. 
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3.3.2. The impact of the recent economic and financial crisis on 
Portugal’s expected exit probability 
As mentioned in the introduction of this dissertation, the 2008’s financial crisis 
launched the debate about the possible exit from the EMU of some of its member states. In 
this context, we will try to understand how this crisis might have changed Portugal’s expected 
exit probability.  
First, we computed, for Portugal, the annual change in the variables capturing the 
determinants of the exit probability, starting in 2000 (from EMU’s inception onwards). Then, 
we multiplied these changes by the marginal effects we got from the baseline model 
presented in Table 7. This gives us the change in the expected exit probability caused by the 
variation of each particular variable. Finally, we summed all the effects to account for the 
total change (in percentage points) on the expected exit probability, in a given year. Results 
on the latter are displayed in Table 11, including or not, the marginal effects from debt 
changes. 
In the four years after the financial crisis (2008), and including debt effects, Portugal’s 
expected exit probability from EMU has always increased by more than one percentage 
point, with a reduction only in 2013. We can also see that public debt accounts for a strong 
positive impact on this increase. Between 2000 and 2014, public debt dramatically changed 
from around 50% to around 130% of GDP.  
In Figure 1 we can have a comparative perspective of the evolution of the expected 
exit probability with and without the contribution of public debt. Between 2001 and 2006 
both series practically followed the same path. Thus, the contribution of the ratio of debt-
to-GDP to the overall change on the expected exit probability did not have a significant 
impact. However, one year before the crisis and in the following years, this scenario clearly 
changed. Between 2011 and 2013, if the ratio of debt over GDP had been kept constant, the 
expected exit probability would have decreased by 1.8 percentage points; instead it 
(predicted) increase was of roughly 1.6 percentage points. Since 2006 (two years before the 
crisis), if the ratio of debt over GDP had been kept constant, the expected exit probability 
would have increased only about 1.1 percentage points; instead, it was predicted to increase 
about 7.8 percentage points, considering debt effects. 
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Table 11 - Total effect on the expected exit probability of Portugal 
(percentage points) 
Year With Debt Without Debt 
2001 1.05055 0.78240 
2002 0.29363 0.03513 
2003 0.31334 0.11339 
2004 -0.08920 -0.26332 
2005 2.55391 2.05179 
2006 0.13367 0.22415 
2007 1.16359 0.48858 
2008 0.51622 0.19682 
2009 1.36108 0.17908 
2010 2.16934 0.92490 
2011 1.26021 -0.24477 
2012 1.11079 -0.35597 
2013 -0.49577 -0.77199 
2014 0.56924 0.45399 
Total effect since 2006 7.78837 1.09478 
Source: Author’s own computation. 
 
Figure 1 - Annual changes in Portugal's expected exit probability from EMU 
 
Source: Author’s own computation 
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3.4. The Reason for Excluding EMU Countries from the Baseline 
Model 
Consider now the inclusion of the EMU countries17 in the sample to estimate the 
“pooled” probit model. 
In general, the results are not robust when we introduce Euro area member-states in 
the sample. The countries are structurally different, with, e.g., larger levels of GDP per capita 
and of public debt. Moreover, although being a small group of countries, they are highly 
interdependent as they belong to the same union (and none ever left), as argued by Rose 
(2007). This causes the quality of adjustment to drop substantially. The Pseudo R2 changed 
from 0.2340 to just 0.0742 (see Table 12) and the model succeeds on the correct prediction 
of only 60.72% of the cases. 
If we compare the coefficients from this estimation (Table 12) with those from 
baseline (Table 5), we conclude that POP, RGDPPC and INFLATION are robust, since 
they continue significant at 10% level and keep the same signal. However, e.g., DEBT is not 
significant anymore at 10% level and the signal of the estimated coefficient changed. This 
variable is very high in European countries, especially during and in the post-crisis periods 
and countries did not withdrawal from EMU. Besides that, POLITY, even though it 
remained significant the signal changed because these countries are democratic but have 
always been in a monetary union since its inception. 
Table 13 shows the probability forecast using the baseline model to each EMU 
country, for 2014. We can see that the expected exit probabilities, besides being almost of 
100% are too identical among these state members (it only differs for the case of 
Luxembourg, a very small country). Model successful prediction for exiting the EMU is thus 
of 0%.  
Indeed, the inclusion in the sample of 12 countries belonging to the EMU strongly 
biases baseline results because they are very dependent and reduce sample volatility. There 
are apparently reasons beyond the purely economic ones that determine the permanence of 
these countries in the EMU. 
We also tried to introduce EMU countries in the FE model, however the output is 
totally identical to that shown in Annex D. The software (Stata) omits the variable for Europe 
                                                 
17 We only have into account the countries that had the euro as their national currency for at least ten years 
before 2014. 
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countries because it can predict “failure” perfectly (as we stated before, there was no exit 
from EMU so far). 
 
Table 12 - Pooled probit estimation including EMU countries 
Variable Coefficient  Robust Std. Err. P>|z| 
POP 0.1678908 *** 0.0266707 0.000 
RGDPPC 0.1534631* 0.0928397 0.098 
GOVEXP -0.0302297*** 0.0075129 0.000 
INVEST -0.0056001 0.0036113 0.121 
TRADE -0.0006069 0.0006756 0.369 
EXTBAL -0.0027793 0.0023679 0.241   
GOVBAL 0.0017758 0.0015935 0.265 
INFLATION 0.013551* 0.0074106 0.067 
POLITY -0.0242447 ***  0.005767 0.000 
DEBT -0.0009484 0.0007012 0.176 
CONSTANT -2.438125   0.5629375 0.000 
Pseudo R2 =0.0742 
Log likelihood = -925.12479 
Source: Author’s own computation. 
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Table 13 – Exit probability forecast for EMU countries in 2014 
Country Probability Forecast 
Austria 0.99104 
Belgium 0.98134 
Finland 0.98106 
France 0.99961 
Germany 0.99969 
Greece 0.99543 
Ireland 0.97429 
Italy 0.99967 
Luxembourg 0.67796 
Netherlands 0.99534 
Portugal 0.99192 
Spain 0.99904 
Source: Author’s own computation. 
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4. Conclusion 
This dissertation intends to review the main determinants for joining/withdrawal from 
a monetary union and collect and group the available exit strategies from a currency union 
(in particular from the EMU). In contrast with the former, the latter issue is rather 
unexplored and non-comprehensively reviewed among the related literature. 
According to Buiter (1999), there must be present one of the next six characteristics, 
among the respected countries, in order to build an OCA: 1) high degree of labor mobility; 
2) low degree of nominal rigidity in domestic prices; 3) high degree of trade openness across 
countries; 4) similarity of economic structures; 5) well diversified production structures and 
6) existence of supranational fiscal tax-cum-transfer mechanisms. However, even that a 
country decides to join a currency union, in the future, can be reached to the conclusion that 
the respective costs are higher than the benefits.  
In this way, in an exit context and with a particular focus on EMU, we found that 
worries on the legal, political and economic implications that a withdrawal from the EMU 
can entail are common in the literature. Most of the related literature analysis focuses on 
Greece, because of the increased risk the recent crisis triggered on its exit. Formally, to 
withdraw, a country must use the Article 50 to exit EU and then apply to re-join EU, but 
without taking the euro as a currency. Second, there is a consensus regarding the exchange 
rate regime to adopt: it must be in a flexible one. However, there is no unanimity on whether 
there should be an appreciation or a depreciation of the new national currency. Bootle (2012) 
defends that a country like Greece needs to depreciate its new currency against the euro to 
restore its competitiveness. But according to Toporowski (2013), this depreciation would 
inflate the value of Greek debt, even taking account the needs for increasing external 
competitiveness. So, according to the author, the new currency should be introduced with a 
stable, or appreciated, value against the euro. 
Some of the literature also focuses on how an exit should be made in practice. Some 
authors support the need for keeping secret throughout the entire exit arrangement, e.g. Dor 
(2011) and Bootle (2012), to minimize possible costs like banking runs or fall in asset prices. 
Although, Amaral (2013) and Vieira (2012) argue in favor of a signalized and smooth 
withdrawal. One argues that an exit made in secret would be politically unacceptable and it 
would be necessary the declaration of a state of exception, and the other states that a signaled 
and smooth transition exit process could avoid a decline in the standard of living of the exit 
country. 
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In the second part of this dissertation, the ultimate objective is to analyze the feasibility 
of Portugal to be part of the EMU and how the 2008’s financial crisis shaped its expected 
exit probability from EMU. In order to accomplish this, we need a model to predict exit 
probabilities from monetary unions. Thus, we set a “pooled” probit estimation following 
Rose (2007), where a set of ten literature-based variables were used to explain exit probability 
as a latent, dependent variable. Collected data covers 145 countries and territories from 1948 
to 2014, but data for estimation include only 1259 observations out of 9715 total entries, due 
to existing gaps. EMU countries were not accounted for in the baseline model because the 
results were not robust, and the model performed substantially worse since EMU countries 
are structurally different from the remainder in the sample (mainly countries from Africa and 
American islands) and skew the results. 
We conclude, as expected, that smaller (in terms of population) and more autocratic 
countries, with smaller GDP per capita, lower inflation rates and lower debt (as a percentage 
of GDP), have a lower probability of exiting from a monetary union. However, countries 
with lower trade, lower investment, lower external balance and lower government budget 
balance (all these variables as a percentage of GDP), have a higher probability of exiting from 
a monetary union. 
Using exit probability forecasts for the countries in the sample that were members of 
a currency union in 2014, we split countries into two groups, with high and low than average 
exit probability. We then characterize each group regarding the determinants for exiting a 
monetary union. We find that using data for 2014, Portugal profile was close to that of sample 
countries with an expected exit probability higher than 0.555. We also found that the financial 
crisis of 2008 had a positive impact on the expected probability of Portugal exiting from 
EMU. Moreover, if we do not consider the impact of the changes on the debt-to-GDP ratio, 
the expected exit probability would have decreased in 2011 and 2012. We can conclude that 
despite all the effort made by the Portuguese political authorities to cope with the crisis, if it 
there is no stabilization in this ratio or even a reduction, this probability may continue to 
increase, making eminent an exit situation. 
This study has, however, some limitations. First, there are not many studies that focus 
on how a country can make a successful withdrawal from a currency union, and thus this 
analysis relies only on very few authors. Second, in regard to the empirical application, also 
only very few studies assess the probability of a country to exit from a currency union. 
Moreover, there are a lot of gaps in the sample which crucially reduces potential sample to a 
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common sample for balanced-panel estimation. Unbalanced-data panel estimation, 
accounting for country-specific fixed effects, is clearly an avenue for a future better 
assessment of exit probabilities. Finally, we followed the definition of currency union as in 
Rose (2007) and did not use EMU countries in the baseline sample. However, for future 
research, the sample can be extended over the Bretton Woods agreement and the Monetary 
Snake periods, further including, e.g., conventional pegs and horizontal bands, in order to 
investigate, for example, the probability of a country to give up a peg. 
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Annexes 
Annex A - Article 50 from the consolidated version of the European 
Union Treaty 
Article 50 
1. Any Member State may decide to withdraw from the Union in accordance with its 
own constitutional requirements.  
2. A Member State which decides to withdraw shall notify the European Council of its 
intention. In the light of the guidelines provided by the European Council, the Union shall 
negotiate and conclude an agreement with that State, setting out the arrangements for its 
withdrawal, taking account of the framework for its future relationship with the Union. That 
agreement shall be negotiated in accordance with Article 218(3) of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union. It shall be concluded on behalf of the Union by the 
Council, acting by a qualified majority, after obtaining the consent of the European 
Parliament. 
3. The Treaties shall cease to apply to the State in question from the date of entry into 
force of the withdrawal agreement or, failing that, two years after the notification referred to 
in paragraph 2, unless the European Council, in agreement with the Member State 
concerned, unanimously decides to extend this period. 
4. For the purposes of paragraphs 2 and 3, the member of the European Council or of 
the Council representing the withdrawing Member State shall not participate in the 
discussions of the European Council or Council or in decisions concerning it. 
A qualified majority shall be defined in accordance with Article 238(3)(b) of the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union. 
5. If a State which has withdrawn from the Union asks to rejoin, its request shall be 
subject to the procedure referred to in Article 49. 
 
Annex B – Article 44, 61 and 62 from the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties 
Article 44 - Separability of treaty provisions  
1. A right of a party, provided for in a treaty or arising under article 56, to denounce, 
withdraw from or suspend the operation of the treaty may be exercised only with respect to 
the whole treaty unless the treaty otherwise provides or the parties otherwise agree.  
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2. A ground for invalidating, terminating, withdrawing from or suspending the 
operation of a treaty recognized in the present Convention may be invoked only with respect 
to the whole treaty except as provided in the following paragraphs or in article 60.  
3. If the ground relates solely to particular clauses, it may be invoked only with respect 
to those clauses where: (a) The said clauses are separable from the remainder of the treaty 
with regard to their application; (b) it appears from the treaty or is otherwise established that 
acceptance of those clauses was not an essential basis of the consent of the other party or 
parties to be bound by the treaty as a whole; and (c) continued performance of the remainder 
of the treaty would not be unjust. 
4. In cases falling under articles 49 and 50 the State entitled to invoke the fraud or 
corruption may do so with respect either to the whole treaty or, subject to paragraph 3, to 
the particular clauses alone.  
5. In cases falling under articles 51, 52 and 53, no separation of the provisions of the 
treaty is permitted. 
 
Article 61 - Supervening impossibility of performance 
1. A party may invoke the impossibility of performing a treaty as a ground for 
terminating or withdrawing from it if the impossibility results from the permanent 
disappearance or destruction of an object indispensable for the execution of the treaty. If the 
impossibility is temporary, it may be invoked only as a ground for suspending the operation 
of the treaty. 
2. Impossibility of performance may not be invoked by a party as a ground for 
terminating, withdrawing from or suspending the operation of a treaty if the im possibility is 
the result of a breach by that party either of an obligation under the treaty or of any other 
international obligation owed to any other party to the treaty. 
 
Article 62 – Fundamental change of circumstances 
1. A fundamental change of circumstances which has occurred with regard to those 
existing at the time of the conclusion of a treaty, and which was not foreseen by the parties, 
may not be invoked as a ground for terminating or withdrawing from the treaty unless: (a) 
the existence of those circumstances constituted an essential basis of the con sent of the 
parties to be bound by the treaty; and (b) the effect of the change is radically to transform 
the extent of obligations still to be performed under the treaty. 
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2. A fundamental change of circumstances may not be invoked as a ground for 
terminating or withdrawing from a treaty: (a) if the treaty establishes a boundary; or (b) if the 
fundamental change is the result of a breach by the party invoking it either of an obligation 
under the treaty or of any other international obligation owed to any other party to the treaty. 
3. If, under the foregoing paragraphs, a party may invoke a fundamental change of 
circumstances as a ground for terminating or withdrawing from a treaty it may also invoke 
the change as a ground for suspending the operation of the treaty. 
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Annex C - Countries of interest 
 
Country/Territory Currency Union Peg 1:1 Year 
Algeria   FF 1948-1963 
American Samoa USD   1948-2014 
Andorra FF, PST, EURO   1948-2014 
Angola    ESC 1948-1975 
Anguilla (UK) ECD   1948-2014 
Antigua and Barbuda ECD   1948-2014 
Aruba CAC   1948-1985 
Bahamas    PSTER, USD 1948-1965; 1971-2014 
Bahrain  IR IR 1948-1965 
Bangladesh PR   1948-1971 
Barbados ECD ECD 1948-1975 
Benin  CFAXOF   1948-2014 
Bermuda PSTER, USD   1948-2014 
Bhutan  IR   1948-2014 
Bonaire, Sint Eustatius and Saba (Netherlands) CAC   1948-2010 
Bosnia and Herzegovina    GDM 1948-1999 
Botswana SAR PSTER 1948-1976 
British Indian Ocean  PSTER, USD IR 1948-2014 
Brunei MD MD 1948-2014 
Burkina Faso  CFAXOF   1948-2014 
Burundi    BF 1948-1963 
Cameroon  CFAXAF   1948-2014 
Cape Verde ESC ESC 1948-1976 
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Cayman Islands (UK) ECD, JMD   1948-1972 
Central African Rep  CFAXAF   1948-2014 
Chad  CFAXAF   1948-2014 
Christmas Island (Australia) AD, MD   1948-2014 
Comoros CFAXMCF   1948-1993 
Congo  CFAXAF BF 1948-2014 
Cook Islands (New Zealand)  NZD   1948-2014 
Cuba    USD 1948-1958; 1986-2014 
Curaçao (Netherlands) CAC   1948-2014 
Dominica ECD   1948-2014 
Dominican Republic    USD 1948-1984 
Ecuador USD   2001-2014 
El Salvador  USD   2001-2014 
Equatorial Guinea CFAXAF, PST PST 1948-2014 
Faeroe Islands (Denmark) DK   1948-2014 
Falkland Islands (UK)  PSTER   1948-2014 
Fiji    PSTER 1948-1968 
French Guiana (France) FF   1948-2014 
French Polynesia (France)  CFPF CFPF 1948-2014 
Gabon CFAXAF   1948-2014 
Gambia    PSTER 1948-1971 
Ghana    PSTER 1948-1965 
Gibraltar (UK)  PSTER   1948-2014 
Greenland (Denmark) DK   1948-2014 
Grenada ECD   1948-2014 
Guadeloupe (France) FF FF 1948-2014 
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Guam  USD   1948-2014 
Guernsey (UK)  PSTER   1948-2014 
Guinea  CFAXOF   1948-1959 
Guinea Bissau  CFAXOF, ESC ESC 1948-1976; 1997-2014 
Guyana   ECD, USD 1948-1970 
Iraq    PSTER 1948-1966 
Isle of Man (UK)    PSTER 1948-2014 
Ivory Coast  CFAXOF   1948-2014 
Jamaica ECD, JD   1948-1969 
Jersey (UK)   PSTER 1948-2014 
Jordan    PSTER 1948-1966 
Kenya EACA   1948-1977 
Kiribati AD   1948-2014 
Kosovo  GDM, EURO   1948-1998; 2002-2014 
Kuwait IR IR, PSTER 1948-1966 
Lesotho SAR PSTER 1948-2014 
Liberia  USD   1948-2014 
Libya EP PSTER 1948-1966 
Liechtenstein SF   1948-2014 
Madagascar CFAXMCF   1948-1981 
Malawi    PSTER 1948-1970 
Maldives PSTER PK, IR 1948-1975 
Mali  CFAXOF   1948-1961; 1984-2014 
Marshall Island  USD   1948-2014 
Martinique (France) FF, EURO FF 1948-2014 
Mauritania  CFAXOF   1948-1972 
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Mauritius    IR 1948-1965 
Mayotte (France) CFAXMCF FF 1948-2014 
Micronesia USD   1948-2014 
Montserrat (UK) ECD   1948-2014 
Morocco FF, PST   1948-1959 
Mozambique    ESC 1948-1976 
Myanmar   PK, IR 1948-1970 
Namibia SAR SAR 1948-2014 
Nauru AD   1948-2014 
Nepal  IR   1948-1965 
New Caledonia (France)  CFPF CFPF 1948-2014 
New Zealand    PSTER 1948-1967 
Niger  CFAXOF   1948-2014 
Nigeria PSTER PSTER 1948-1966 
Niue (New Zealand)  NZD   1948-2014 
Norfolk Island (Australia)  AD   1948-2014 
Northern Mariana Islands (USA)  USD   1948-2014 
Oman  IR IR 1948-1965 
Pakistan  IR   1948-1949; 1956-1966 
Palau  USD   1948-2014 
Palestine INS   1948-2014 
Panama  USD   1948-2014 
Papua New Guinea  AD   1948-1975 
Pitcairn Islands (New Zealand)  NZD   1948-2014 
Puerto Rico (USA)  USD   1948-2014 
Qatar  IR, QDR IR, QDR 1948-2014 
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Reunion (France) CFAXCFG, FF   1948-2014 
Samoa    PSTER 1948-1967 
San Marino IL   1948-2014 
Sao Tome & Principe   ESC 1948-1977 
Saudi Arabia   PSTER, QDR 1948-1966 
Senegal  CFAXOF   1948-2014 
Seychelles   MR, IR 1948-1975 
Sierra Leone  PSTER   1948-1965 
Singapore  MD   1948-1966 
Sint Maarten (Netherlands) CAC   1948-2014 
Solomon Islands  AD   1948-1978 
Somalia    EACA 1948-1971 
South Africa    PSTER 1948-1960 
South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands (UK) PSTER   1948-2014 
South Sudan EP   1948-1961 
Sri Lanka    IR 1948-1965 
St. Helena (UK)    PSTER 1948-2014 
St. Kitts and Nevis  ECD   1948-2014 
St. Lucia ECD   1948-2014 
St. Pierre and Miquelon (France) CFAXCFG, FF, EURO   1948-2014 
St. Vincent ECD   1948-2014 
Sudan  PSTER PSTER 1948-1961 
Suriname   CAC 1948-1994 
Svalbard and Jan Mayen  NK   1948-2014 
Swaziland SAR   1948-2014 
Tanzania EACA EACA 1948-1977 
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Timor Leste  USD   1948-2014 
Togo CFAXOF   1948-2014 
Tokelau (New Zealand) NZD   1948-2014 
Tonga  AD   1948-1990 
Trinidad and Tobago ECD, PSTER ECD 1948-1975 
Tunisia FF   1948-1959 
Turks and Caicos Islands (UK) USD PSTER 1952-1965 
Tuvalu AD   1948-2014 
Uganda EACA EACA 1948-1977 
United Arab Emirates IR, QDR IR, QDR 1948-2014 
United States Minor USD   1948-2014 
Vanuatu    CFPF 1948-1969 
Virgin Islands (UK) ECD, PSTER   1948-2014 
Virgin Islands (USA) USD   1948-2014 
Wallis and Futuna (France) CFPF CFPF 1948-2014 
Yemen Arab Republic IR EACA 1948-1971 
Zambia    PSTER 1948-1966 
Zimbabwe   PSTER 1948-2014 
 
Notes: (1) AD- Australian Dollar; BF- Belgian Franc; CAC- Central America and the Caribbean; CFAXAF- Central African CFA Franc; CFAXCFG-San Pierre CFA 
Franc ; CFAXMCF- Madagascar/Comores CFA Franc; CFAXOF- West African CFA Fran; CFPF- Franc Pacifique; EACA- East African Currency Area; EB- Ethiopian Birr; 
ECD- East Caribbean Dollar; EP- Egyptian Pound; ESC- Escudo; FF- French Franc; FIP- French Indochina Piastre; GDM- German Deutsch Mark; IL- Italy Lira; INS- Israel 
New Sheqel; IR- Indian Rupee; JD- Jordanian dinar; JMD- Jamaica Dollar; MD- Malaya Dollar; MR- Mauritius Rupee; NG- Netherlands Guilder; NK- Norway Krone; NZD- 
New Zealand Dollar; PR- Pakistan Rupee; PST- Peseta; PSTER- Pound Sterling; QDR- Qatar-Dubai Riyal; SAR- South Africa Rand; SF- Swiss Franc; SR- Soviet Ruble; USD- 
United States Dollar. 
(2) The Territories that are not independent have their respective State mentioned in brackets. 
Source: Author’s own computation. 
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Annex D – FE probit estimation without EMU countries 
 
Variable Coefficient  Robust Std. Err. P>|z| 
POP 0.5302213*** 0.0400133 0.000 
RGDPPC 1.410809*** 0.1412659 0.000 
GOVEXP 0.0008141 0.0080914 0.920 
INVEST -0.0072839 0.0045887 0.112 
TRADE -0.0019162** 0.0008347 0.022 
EXTBAL -0.0079387** 0.0032701 0.015  
GOVBAL -0.0029765** 0.0012592 0.018 
INFLATION 0.0109467* 0.0056016 0.051 
POLITY 0.0391924*** 0.0073515 0.000 
DEBT 0.0037371*** 0.0008932 0.000 
CONSTANT -13.06682*** 0.9095265 0.000 
Id    
2 0.2768125** 0.1157402 0.017 
3 -0.3718095*** 0.1420011 0.009 
4 0 - - 
5 0 - - 
Pseudo R2 =0.2761 
Log pseudolikelihood = -563.59755 
Total observations: 1171 
Note: * (significant at 0.10); ** (significant at 0.05); *** (significant at 0.01). 
Source: Author´s own computation. 
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Annex E – Marginal effects from the FE probit estimation without 
EMU countries 
Variable dy/dx Std. Err. 
POP .1437416 .0077399 
RGDPPC .3824666 .0318032 
GOVEXP .0002207 .0022001 
INVEST -.0019746 .0011816 
TRADE -.0005195 .0002769 
EXTBAL -.0021522 .000784 
GOVBAL -.0008069 .0006072 
INFLATION .0029676 .000591 
POLITY .010625 .0021259 
DEBT .0010131 .0002117 
ID   
2 0.0736464 0.0333546 
3 -0.1054906 0.0390336 
4 - - 
5 - - 
Source: Author´s own computation. 
 
 
